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In recent years, rapid and unexpected increases in the price level have 
significantly eroded the value of retirees’ private pension benefits. An 
employee who retired in 1970 with a pension equal to 50% of the average 
manufacturing  wage  received  a  monthly  check  for  $289. The 113% 
increase in the level of consumer prices in the subsequent decade reduced 
the real value of that pension benefit by 53% to only 24% of  the average 
1970 manufacturing  wage.  Although  some firms have voluntarily  in- 
creased retirees’ benefits, these adjustments  have almost always been far 
less than the rise in the price level. 
Because retirees obviously care about their real incomes, it is a puzzle 
that, after more than a decade of rapid inflation, private pensions are still 
fixed in nominal terms. Why have employers and employees until now 
not negotiated pension benefits that are indexed or partly indexed to  the 
price level? Alternatively, why have employee pensions not taken the 
form of  variable  annuities  based  on floating rate instruments  whose 
nominal  yield varies in the short run with the rate of  inflation (Bodie 
1980a, 1980b)?’  Does current behavior represent a mistake by employees 
and unions that makes it appropriate in some sense to modify the laws 
governing pensions to require such indexing? 
The present chapter shows that the existing arrangement with purely 
nominal private pensions may in fact be optimal in the presence of the 
indexed system of social security retirement pensions. Of course, since an 
individual who relies on a nominal pension is in effect making a risky 
investment, there will be unexpected losses and gains. The recent losses 
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by retirees should be seen as just such an unfortunate ex post outcome 
and not as an indication  that private pensions either are incompatible 
with inflation or should be indexed. Because protection against inflation 
risk can be obtained only at the cost of accepting a lower expected rate of 
return,*  the potential retiree will generally choose to be less than fully 
protected against inflation (i.e., will choose a partially indexed pension). 
Moreover, social  security retirement benefits provide a fully indexed 
pension that replaces a substantial fraction of  previous peak earnings for 
most current retirees.’ The combination of  social security and a private 
pension thus provides a total pension arrangement that is substantially 
indexed even if the private pension is fixed in nominal terms. For most 
employees, the extent of indexing in the combined pension may be such 
that no indexing of the private pension would be de~ired.~ 
The analysis in this chapter makes these ideas more precise and proves 
specific conclusions. Although the models employed are clearly a sim- 
plification of reality, I believe that they capture the essential features of 
the problem. The first section of the chapter analyzes an economy with- 
out social security in which all retirement consumption is financed by a 
private  pension.  In section 8.2, social  security  is introduced  and the 
analysis examines the optimal mix of social security and private pensions 
as well as the optimal indexing of  private pensions. The third section 
extends this analysis to a social security program with uncertain benefits.’ 
There is then a brief concluding section. 
8.1  Optimal Pension Indexing without Social Security 
The simplest framework within which to analyze the problem of pen- 
sion indexing is a two-period two-asset model. Employees work in the 
first period and contribute an amount C to a retirement pension. In the 
second period  of  their life, employees are retired and then receive  a 
pension with real (but generally uncertain) value P. 
In a defined-contribution type of pension plan, employees invest their 
pension contributions in a portfolio of bonds and corporate stock. When 
they retire they receive an annuity based on the value of these assets. 
Since the value of bonds and their interest payments are fixed in nominal 
terms, the real rate of  return of  the bond portion varies inversely with 
changes in both the price level and the rate of  inflation. Although the real 
value of corporate stock should be unaffected  by changes in the price 
level, changes in the expected rate of  inflation do cause changes in real 
share values  (see, e.g., Hendershott and  Hu  1979; Feldstein  1980u, 
1980b; Summers 1981~).  Thus the real value of  a defined-contribution 
pension invested in any combination of  bonds and stocks is uncertain. 
In the more common defined-benefit type of  pension, the employer 
invests the contributions and promises the employee benefits that depend 213  Should Private Pensions Be Indexed? 
on the employee’s final year’s earnings and that then remain fixed in 
nominal terms.6  In the simplest interpretation of the defined-benefit plan, 
the retired employee has a fixed nominal annuity that is analogous to a 
bond. Because the firm can invest the pension funds  in a mix of bonds that 
exactly matches the benefit obligation, the firm provides this bond yield 
to  the retiree. Although firms may in fact invest pension assets in a mix of 
stocks and bonds, the equity owners of  the firm receive the excess return 
(if any) generated in this way in exchange for accepting the extra risk of a 
nonhedged investment. 
More generally, however, the employee in a defined-benefit plan may 
receive benefits that depend on the performance of  the pension fund. 
This is true not only because a low enough value of fund assets can reduce 
benefits below the promised level but also because  successful pension 
performance can lead to increases in the promised level of benefits and ad 
hoc “voluntary” increases in benefits to retirees.’ In what follows, I do 
not distinguish between defined-benefit and defined-contribution plans. 
Although virtually all private pensions are unindexed, this is not neces- 
sary. Zvi Bodie (1980a, 1980b) has recently shown that assets invested in 
a  sequence of  3-month  Treasury bills ,provide a  very  good  inflation 
hedge.R  Thus, individuals in a defined-contribution plan can achieve an 
essentially risk-free real return by investing in bills, and an employer who 
manages a defined-benefit plan can offer an essentially indexed pension 
without additional risk to shareholders by  investing in such bills. 
I shall denote the real return on bills as the random variable rb with 
mean pJ.h  and variance uih.  If this type of  investment provides a perfect 
index asset, there is no correlation between r, and the inflation rate. In 
some of  the analysis that follows, I shall make the stronger assumption 
that r, is a constant (a& = 0). Bodie’s empirical analysis showed that the 
return on the minimum  real variance  portfolio has averaged  approx- 
imately zero (i.e.. J*h = 0). and the annual standard deviation was ap- 
proximately one percentage point (ubb = 0.01). In the important special 
case of &,  = ugh = 0, ‘‘bills” are a perfect real store of value and invest- 
ment in bills provides an indexed pension. 
Similarly, I shall denote the real yield on the completely unindexed 
pension by the random variable r, with mean pLL  and variance a:,.  This 
yield can be interpreted as the yield that is implicit in setting the level of 
the nominal annuity of a strict defined-benefit plan, or as the ex post yield 
on the mix of debt and equity in a defined-contribution plan, or as the ex 
post yield on a performance-related  defined-benefit plan. 
The real value of the employee’s pension in retirement is given by 
(1)  P = u (1 f cL)  $- (c  -  u)(  1 f rb), 
where Cis  the pension contribution, U is the amount of the contribution 
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or the defined-benefit type), and C  -  U is the “indexed” portion repre- 
sented by an investment in bills. The employee’s problem in designing a 
pension is thus similar to a portfolio allocation problem-that  is, selecting 
the value of  U that maximizes the employee’s expected utility of  retire- 
ment consumption E [V(P)]  subject to the constraint implied by equation 
(1).9  I shall assume throughout the analysis that short-sales of either asset 
are not permitted; thus, C>  U>O. 
If the returns (ru  and rb) are normally distributed (or if  the individual’s 
utility function can be approximated by a quadratic function), the indi- 
vidual’s preferences can be represented graphically by a set of  indiffer- 
ence curves in terms of  the mean and standard deviation of the portfolio’s 
terminal value  (Tobin  1958). Figure  8.1 combines these indifference 
curves with the opportunity locus in the important case in which invest- 
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Consider first the line connecting the origin with point 0.  The origin 
represents a pension fund invested exclusively in bills (and is therefore 
marked with the letter 6). Because there is no uncertainty about the real 
return on these assets, the standard deviation of  the pension benefit is 
zero. The pension benefit is therefore C, the initial contribution. Point u 
represents the pension that results when the pension is completely unin- 
dexed. Since the standard deviation of the return per dollar contributed 
to the unindexed pension is uuu,  the standard deviation of the pension 
benefit  is  ucr,,.  Equation  (1)  implies  that, for  any  U, the expected 
pension benefit is E(P)  = C -  U + U(l + p,)  = C + Upu.  The expected 
benefit  associated  with  the  completely  unindexed  pension  is  thus 
C+  up,.  Any point  on the straight  line  between  the origin  and 0 
represents a feasible pension allocation. 
The indifference curve tangent to the 60  line at E represents prefer- 
ences that lead to a partially indexed pension; any move toward more 
complete indexing causes a reduction in expected pension benefits that 
outweighs the reduction in risk. 
Different preferences would lead to different degrees of  pension in- 
dexing. A reduction in risk aversion implies flatter indifference curves 
(i.e., more nearly  parallel  to the horizontal  axis)  and can  imply  no 
tangency along the 60  line. In this case, the optimal pension will corres- 
pond to  point  with no indexing at a11.I0 Increases in risk aversion shifts 
the optimum to a more fully indexed pension but, except for the case of 
“infinitely” risk-averse individuals, the optimum will not involve a fully 
indexed pension.” Thus the optimal pension will not be fully indexed and 
may be either partially indexed or not indexed at all. 
To make these ideas more precise, consider an individual whose pref- 
erences can be represented by a constant absolute risk-aversion utility 
function, V(P)  = -  (1  /a)ePaP  with risk-aversion parameter  (Y >  0 (Arrow 
1971). Since the amount of  the pension contribution that is unindexed is 
U,  the value of the pension is the random amount P = C + ruU.  Thus, 
and, if  the return r,, is normally distributed, 
(3)  E[V(P)]  = - 
Maximizing  E[V(P)]  with respect to U implies the optimal unindexed 
share of  the pension is 
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For  any  finite  value  of  the risk-aversion  parameter,  U* >O  and the 
pension is less than completely indexed. Moreover, if  the risk aversion 
and the variance are low enough relative  to the expected return, the 
entire pension fund will be unindexed (U*  >  C).': 
Returning to figure 8.1, we can consider the effect of  an increase in 
inflation  uncertainty  on the optimal  extent of  pension  indexing.  An 
increase in  inflation  uncertainty  (on the assumption that bills permit 
complete indexing) is equivalent to an increase in the variance of  the 
unindexed pension and therefore a shift in locus of feasible pensions from 
6u to but.  At every point along 60' the trade-off  between risk  and 
return is less favorable; a greater increase in real risk must be accepted for 
each increase in expected real return. Moreover, at the degree of index- 
ing that was optimal with the lower level of  inflation uncertainty (i.e., at 
point E' on but  that corresponds to point E on bu),  the individual has 
the same expected return but more risk. It seems likely, therefore, that 
with more initial risk and a less favorable risk-return trade-off the indi- 
vidual would choose to index the pension more completely. This is shown 
in figure 8.1, where the new optimum at E2  lies closer than E' to the 
complete indexing point. In the constant absolute risk-aversion case of 
equation (4) it is also clear that an increase in  causes U* to fall and the 
optimal degree of  indexing to rise.13 
This shift in the degree of pension indexing shows two of the adverse 
consequences associated with an increase in inflation uncertainty. First, 
in order to reduce the added risk, individuals shift their pensions to a 
more completely indexed form with lower expected yield. Second, even 
with a greater degree of indexing, the individual may have a greater risk 
(as shown in fig. 8.1). The lower indifference curve at E2  reflects both of 
these adverse consequences. 
The analysis based on figure 8.1  and equation (2) assumed the possibil- 
ity of a perfectly indexed pension that provides a perfect store of  value 
but  no real  return.'" More generally,  a pension  based  on a variable 
annuity invested in money market instruments ("bills")  would provide a 
random return with mean &,,  variance a&,,  and covariance (TLb with the 
return on an unindexed  pension  fund. With  rb  uncertain, it  follows 
from equation  (1)  that  the  variance  of  the  pension  value  is  (C - 
U)2a&, + U'at,  + 21/(c  -  U)f&,.  The minimum variance does not cor- 
respond  to a pension  invested  only  in  bills but  to one in  which  the 
unindexed fraction is 
(5) 
The real returns on an unindexed pension and on bills may be corre- 
lated either positively or negatively. If  the correlation is negative (e.g., 
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nominal long rate and therefore with a fall in bond prices or in the real 
value of a fixed nominal annuity)  <  0 and U is between zero and C, 
implying that the minimum variance pension is only partially indexed. 
This case is shown by the 6U curve in figure 8.2; the point marked U 
indicates the minimum variance mix. 
Even if  the correlation  between  the real yields  on bills and on an 
unindexed  pension is positive, the minimum variance pension is only 
partly indexed if &, <  (Tgb (i.e., if the regression coefficient of the return 
on the unindexed pension on the return on bills is less than one). When 
this is not true (i.e., when  >  &),  the minimum variance pension is 
invested in bills  If  (.',b  =  (Tbb, the investment opportunity locus 
looks like hU' in figure 8.2 with the minimum variance at point 6. If, 
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figure 8.2 with  an unconstrained  minimum variance  point  that corre- 
sponds to a short position in the unindexed pension. 
As the indifference curves in figure 8.2 indicate, whenever u2hb >  utb 
the optimum pension will never be invested completely in the security 
that provides the greatest indexing. This is obvious when the minimum 
variance real return requires only partial indexing (I&  <  ugh);  only the 
portion  of  the bu  locus between  U and 0  is  efficient  since a more 
completely indexed pension would have both a lower expected return and 
greater variance. But even when the unconstructed minimum variance 
pension is invested in bills only (a$,  = a&,), the optimum pension is at 
least partly unindexed because at point 5 a small increase in yield can be 
obtained with essentially no increase in risk.Ib  Only in the case where the 
bills-only  pension  represents a  constrained  minimum  variance  (atb 
-  >ugh)  might an indifference curve be tangent to the opportunity locus at 
b. Of course, in all three cases individuals with low enough risk aversion 
will prefer to have no indexing at all. 
These ideas can again be made more precise by considering the special 
case of a constant absolute risk-aversion utility function. It follows from 
equations (1) and (2)  that 
Maximizing E[V(P)]  with respect to U implies 
(7) 
Since  the  value  of  U  that  minimizes  the  real  variance  is  U= 
C(&  -  U$,)/(U~~  + crib -  2u$,),  it is clear from equation (7) that the 
optimal  pension  will  always  have  fewer  bills  (and  therefore greater 
variance) than the minimum variance investment. When variations in the 
real yields on bills and the unindexed pension are negatively correlated 
(a:b  <  O),  the minimum variance U>  0 and therefore U* >  0. Moreover, 
for a sufficiently low degree of  risk aversion, U* ZA  and the pension is 
completely unindexed. Similarly, if  u&, = uth,  U = 0 but U*  >  0 and, for 
low enough a,  U* 3 C.  Thus, even when the unconstrained minimum 
variance pension requires investing in bills only, the optimal pension will 
be partly  unindexed  and may  be  completely  unindexed.  Only  when 219  Should Private Pensions Be Indexed? 
o&,<&  by  enough to offset the yield differential  (pu  -  pb) will the 
pension be invested exclusively in bills but, in that case also, the bills-only 
portfolio does not achieve the minimum variance. 
The results of  this section can be summarized briefly. Even when a 
perfectly indexed pension can be obtained by investing pension funds in 
money market instruments, individuals will  always prefer  a less than 
completely indexed pension. When such bills are a risky asset, the mini- 
mum variance pension may be achieved by investing in bills only or by a 
partly indexed pension, depending  on the regression coefficient between 
the unindexed pension yield and the bill yield. However, individuals will 
always  prefer  a  pension  that has more real  risk  than  the minimum 
variance pension. In both cases, the individual who has a sufficiently low 
degree of risk aversion will want a pension that is invested exclusively in 
the higher-yielding asset and that makes no attempt to reduce the risk of 
inflation. 
8.2  Pension Indexing with Riskless Social Security 
As Paul Samuelson (1958) has shown, a pay-as-you-go social security 
pension pays a real return on tax “contributions” equal to the real growth 
rate of labor income. This is easily shown in the context of  the present 
two-period  model.  Assume  that there are N1  workers in  the current 
generation (denoted by the subscript 1)  and that each worker earns a real 
wage of w,.  If the social security program imposes a tax at rate t,  the total 
contribution of these workers is Tl  = tw,  N,.  These funds are immediately 
paid out as benefits to the current retirees (i.e., the previous generation 
of workers). The next generation of N2  workers will earn w2  N2  and pay a 
total  tax of  T2 = tw2N2  if  the tax rate remains unchanged.  These tax 
revenues will then be paid out as social security benefits to the current 
employees, B, = tw&”. 
The relation  between  the taxes paid  by  the current generation  of 
workers (TI)  and the benefits that they subsequently receive (B,)  is thus: 
where y is the growth rate of  real wages per employee, n is the growth rate 
of  the labor force, and g is the growth rate of  total labor income. Thus, 
even though social security contributions are not invested, participants 
earn a real return on their contributions in a growing economy. In the 
United States economy during the past 30 years, total employee com- 
pensation has grown at an average annual rate of  about 3%.” 
The important feature about the social security program in the present 
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dexed. The real  tax revenue available to pay  benefits may  vary with 
productivity  and with  changes in  population  growth  and  labor  force 
participation, but it does not depend on the price level. As a result, the 
United States and  other countries with  pay-as-you-go  social  security 
pensions  promise benefits that are fully indexed to inflation.lx In this 
chapter, I shall take the pay-as-you-go (i.e.,  unfunded) character of social 
security  as given” and  ask  how  the  existence  of  such social  security 
benefits influence the optimal indexing of  private pensions. To begin, I 
shall assume that there is  no uncertainty about the rate of  growth of 
earnings (g) and therefore that social security can provide an indexed 
pension with a fixed rate of return, g. I shall examine the optimal mix of 
social security and a private pension in this case and then the effect of an 
arbitrarily fixed amount of social security on the optimal indexing of the 
private pension.  The fourth section extends the analysis  to the more 
general  situation  in  which  uncertainty  about real  growth of  earnings 
implies uncertainty about the real return on social security. 
The simplest case to consider is the one in which bills provide a perfect 
store of value with no uncertainty and a zero real return. Social security 
with expected return g and no uncertainty then clearly dominates any 
investment in bills. The individual prefers a combination of social sec 
and a completely unindexed private pension, with the preferred combina- 
tion reflecting the individual’s risk aversion, the expected returns on an 
unindexed pension and on social security, and the variance of  the real 
yield  on  the unindexed  pension.  It  is worth  emphasizing that in  this 
important case the optimal  private pension  is  completely unindexed. 
Private pensions may be indexed only because of  departures from the 
assumptions of  this case: uncertain returns on bills or on social security or 
a suboptimal amount of social security. 
This case is illustrated in figure 8.3. Point  r/ corresponds to a private 
pension  invested  only  in  bonds and no social security.  Point 6 corre- 
sponds to a fully indexed private pension invested only in bills and no 
social  security.  Point s corresponds  to social  security  only,  with  no 
private pension. It is clear that point  dominates point 6 and that, while 
any point in the triangle connecting points 6, s,  and u is feasible, only 
points on the SU line are efficient. The indifference curve is drawn so that 
the optimal pension (at El)  is one-half social security and one-half  an 
unindexed private pension. 
For an individual with a constant absolute risk-aversion utility func- 
tion, the optimal amount of  the unindexed private pension is 
PLl  ~  Ps  u* =  ~ 
where  p,s  is the yield on social security tax contributions. The optimal 
amount to be contributed to social security is then C -  U*.”’ 
dL1  ’ 
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Before leaving this case, it is interesting to note the effect of inflation 
uncertainty  on the optimal  amount of  social  security. With  constant 
absolute risk aversion, the effect is unambiguous. An increase in inflation 
uncertainty implies a higher value of u:u and therefore depresses U* in 
equation (2). More inflation uncertainty implies greater reliance on un- 
funded social security and less on the funded private pension. Note that 
this is true even though a completely indexed private pension could be 
achieved by  investing the pension assets in bills. With a more general 
utility function the effect of an increase in inflation uncertainty is formally 
ambiguous but  is likely to increase reliance  on social security.  When 
inflation uncertainty  increases,  the tradeoff  between  risk  and  return 
becomes less favorable to bonds while the amount of  uncertainty at the 
initial level of social security becomes greater. With greater initial levels 222  Martin Feldstein 
of risk and a lower cost of reducing risk, the individual is likely to want to 
reduce risk by increasing reliance on social security." 
Until now, the analysis has assumed that the amount of  social security 
is set optimally. If  the size of the social security pension is instead set 
exogenously at a level that is less than optimal, individuals may want to 
index partially their private pension. In figure 8.3, the kinked line con- 
necting points Ef  and p represents  the efficient frontier when the amount 
of the social security contribution is constrained to equal one-third of C. 
If the private pension (i.e., the amount C-S) is completely indexed, the 
value of  the pension  will  be  C(l + ps/3). This is shown  as point  E', 
one-third of  the way between 6 and 3. If  the private pension  is com- 
pletely  unindexed,  the  expected  value  of  the  pension  is  (C- 
S)(1  + p,,)  + S(l + pS)  and its standard deviation is (C -  S)uuu. This is 
shown as point uf.  If the indifference curve is tangent to the line segment 
b'U', the optimal private  pension  is partially  indexed.  But since the 
segment E'p is steeper than ju, the indifference  curve need not be 
tangent between 6' and u'.  In figure 8.3, the relevant indifference curve 
touches the line at the kink point u' where the private portfolio is not 
indexed at all. Although it may seem surprising that a reduction in the 
indexed  social  security pension  does not  always induce an increased 
indexation of the private pension, this merely reflects the fact that the 
private fully indexed pension has a lower yield than the social security 
pension. 
If  there is no riskless private asset, the analysis of the optimal mix of 
social security and the private pension assets and of the impact of changes 
in the exogenously set level of social security is more complex. In figure 
8.4, the 60  curve represents the purely private pension with different 
combinations of bills and unindexed pensions. If the value of  a pure social 
security pension corresponds to point sl,  any point on any line between 
3, and the 60  locus is feasible. However, only the points on S,u are 
efficient;  all  other  feasible  points  have  lower  means  for  the  same 
variance. But if  the value of  a pure social security pension corresponds to 
p.oint  s2,  the line connecting 3, and u (not drawn) is inefficient. The 
efficient set of  feasible pensions correspond to combinations of  social 
security and a partly indexed pension  (if  the optimum occurs on the 
straight  segment s2X)  or to a partly indexed  pension  with  no social 
security if the optimum lies on the segment Xu  of  the private pension 
curve. In either case, the private pension will not be invested only in bills 
and will in fact contain less in bills than the minimum variance pension 
fund.  Of course, with low risk aversion the indifference curves may not be 
tangent at any feasible point, implying that the optimum is a completely 
unindexed private pension. 
Constraining the amount of social security to be less than the optimal 
amount has the same general effect when bills are risky as it does when 
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they provide a perfect index asset. The optimal pensions may involve 
increased indexing or, if the individual is not very risk averse, no change 
in the original degree of indexing. In particular, even with the amount of 
social security reduced, a completely unindexed pension may be optimal. 
This is illustrated in figure 8.4. 
In the case in which the value of  the pure social security pension would 
be sl,  the optimum pension (at El)  consists of  an equal mix of  social 
security and the completely unindexed pension invested in bonds. Now 
constrain the amount of social security to be one-third of  the total pen- 
sion contribution: S = C/3. This implies that if  the private pension is 
completely  unindexed,  the  total  expected  pension  value  is 
S( 1  + p,)  + U(  1  + p.,) = (1 + k,/3  + 2 pU/3)C and  the  corresponding 
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Similarly, if the private part of  the pension  is completely indexed, the 
mean and standard deviation of  the total pension value is shown at point 
6'. The new opportunity locus is constructed in this way for all points 
between 6' and 0'.  The new optimum private pensions could involve 
partial indexing (i.e., correspond to some point on the 6'u'  locus), but 
since the slope of the new locus is steeper than the slope of the su line, 
the optimum may occur at a corner solution at point u' as shown in figure 
8.4. 
8.3  Optimal Indexing with Uncertain Social Security 
Although unexpected changes in the price level do not alter the real 
value of  a social security pension, unexpected changes in the growth of 
the real wage rate or in the growth of  the labor force are a source of 
potential uncertainty in social security benefits that was ignored in the 
previous section.:* The present section assumes that social security pro- 
vides an uncertain pension. Because the general case in which both bills 
and bonds are also uncertain assets is complex to analyze and not particu- 
larly informative, I focus on the case in which bills provide a perfect index 
asset with zero real return and no variance. 
One example of this situation is shown in figure 8.5. As usual, point 6 
represents a completely indexed private pension, point n a completely 
unindexed private pension, and point  no private pension but reliance 
only on social security. The shape of the su  curve, particularly the fact 
that the minimum variance point does not correspond to 3,  implies that 
variations in the yield on social security and on bonds are independent, 
negatively correlated, or correlated in a weak positive way." Because this 
restriction seems to me to be rather mild, I shall not deal explicitly with 
the alternative case; the results are easily derived by a simple modifica- 
tion of  figure 8.5. 
Points along the Sucurve  represent combinations of social security and 
a completely unindexed private pension. Points on the 6n  line represent 
combinations of social security and a completely indexed private pension. 
Finally, points on the line between 6  and the point of tangency with the 
c/s curve (at X)  represent combinations of social security and a partially 
indexed private plan. 
Since the efficient frontier consists of  the line bX and the segment of 
the curve between X  and U,  several possible pension arrangements can 
immediately be excluded as never optimal for any utility function. First, it 
is never optimal to rely exclusively on either social security (point 3) or on 
a completely indexed  private  pension  (point 6). Further, it  is  never 
optimal to use a combination of just social security and a fully indexed 
private pension (points on line 6s) since a higher mean can be obtained 
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An individual with sufficiently low risk aversion will prefer to have only 
a private pension and one that is not indexed at all. For such an indi- 
vidual,  there will  be  no tangency  on the 5x0  locus but  the highest 
feasible indifference curve will touch point 0.  With more risk aversion, a 
tangency  will  occur  along the XU curve where  the individual  has a 
combination of social security and a completely unindexed private pen- 
sion. Only with sufficiently great risk aversion will the indifference curve 
tangency occur along the 62  line where the individual combines social 
security with a partially indexed private pension. 
Figure 8.6  presents a modified form of figure 8.5 in which no ray from 
the origin  (i.e., from  point  6) is  tangent  to the curve  generated by 
combinations of  social security and the unindexed private pension. Eco- 
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ficiently high relative to its risk, In this case, the efficient set is just the 
straight line bu.  It is never optimal in this case to have any social security, 
and the optimal private pension is either unindexed (as shown by the 
highest feasible indifference curve touching the 6u  line at 0)  or, for a 
more risk-averse individual, by a partly indexed private pension (with the 
indifference curve tangent on the 6u line). 
8.4  Conclusion 
The analysis in this chapter was motivated  by  an apparent puzzle: 
despite substantial uncertainty about future inflation rates, private pen- 
sions are almost universally unindexed. Moreover, although a variable 
annuity invested  in  short-term money  market instruments provides a 
good inflation hedge, almost all private pensions provide a fixed annuity. 227  Should Private Pensions Be Indexed? 
The results of  the analysis indicate that the existence of  unindexed 
pensions and fixed annuities is not at all surprising. Even without social 
security,  it  may  be optimal  to have  a completely  unindexed  private 
pension and it is generally not optimal to have  a completely indexed 
pension. 
The availability of  an optimal (or greater than optimal) amount of 
social security generally  reduces the desired degree  of  indexing and, 
under a variety of  conditions, makes it optimal to have no indexing at all 
in the private pension. 
Because unexpected changes in the price level do not alter the value of 
social security pensions, the existence of  inflation uncertainty makes a 
social security pension optimal when it would not otherwise be and an 
increase in inflation uncertainty is likely to increase the optimal reliance 
on social security. But despite these conclusions, the analysis shows that 
including some social security in an overall pension program is necessarily 
optimal only when both money market instruments and social security 
have rates of  return that are known with certainty. When the real yield on 
money market instruments is uncertain, the optimal pension  arrange- 
ment  may  be  a partially  indexed private pension  even  though  social 
security is risk free and has a return that is higher than the expected rate 
on the money market instruments.  Similarly, when social security is risky, 
the optimal arrangement may be to exclude social security and to use a 
partially indexed private pension. In all cases, an individual who has a low 
enough degree of risk aversion will prefer no social security and a com- 
pletely unindexed private pension. 
Notes 
1. The key issue is the employee’s risk of  uncertain  inflation. It would not really be 
indexing if, instead of  a constant nominal annual benefit, the benefit rises at a rate that is 
fixed at the time of  retirement. Although the increase in benefits might be related to the 
expected rate of  inflation, the employee would continue to bear the entire risk of  unex- 
pected changes in inflation. I shall reserve the term “indexing” for mechanisms that reduce 
the uncertainty of real benefits by linking bcncfits either to the price level or to the yield on 
short-term money market instruments. 
2. Pesando (1981) discusses a very different sense in which it is expensive to maintain the 
real value of  pension benefits: keeping the same initial pension benefit and then raising 
benefits in proportion to the price level clearly increases the expected value of  benefits in all 
subsequent years. My emphasis is on reducing the variance around any expected real stream 
of  benefits. A lower real variance requires investing in assets with a lowcr cxpcctcd return 
and thus increases the cost (i.e.,  the initial value of  assets) required to provide any expected 
stream of  real benefits. 
3. An  employee who has had median earnings for all of  his working life now retires at age 
65 with a social security pension that replaces more than 40% of  his peak pretax earnings. If 
he is married and his wife does not claim benefits on the basis of her own income, his benefit 
will be increased to more than 60% of his peak pretax earnings. Because these benefits are 
not subject to  income or payroll tax, they replace more than 75% of  after-tax earnings. Since 228  Martin Feldstein 
social security is indexcd  by the consumer price index, it is  probably  overindexed with 
respect to a true variable-weight measure of retirees’ cost of  living. 
4.  For employces with very high earnings, social security benefits are low relative to 
private pension  benefits and the degree of overall indexing of  the combined pension is 
therefore correspondingly low. Although such employees may prefer to have some indexing 
of  their pension benefits, the lcgal rules for tax deductible (“qualified”) pensions prcsum- 
ably prevents “discriminating”  among different classes of  employees. Moreover, high- 
income employees tend to have additional portfolio assets and liabilities with which to 
achieve the overall desired degree of indexing (although generally with less favorable tax 
treatmefit). For some lower wage employees the opposite is true; the combined pension 
provides too much indexing.  I  return to thesc below. 
5. All of  the analysis ignores other forms of individual wealth. The vast majority of 
retirees depend almost completely on the combination of social security and other pension 
income. Additional assets generally consist of  only an owner-occupied home and a small 
amount of  liquid precautionary balances. 
6. The nature of  the obligation and of  the investment is actually more complicated in 
practice. Technically the employer is obligated to provide only for the “vested” benefits that 
are based on existing service. But to prevent a rapid increase in pension costs as employees 
approach  retirement,  employers often anticipate future expected pension  obligations. 
Some firms, however, do not fund even their vested obligations fully but substitute an 
implicit corporate promise. See Feldstein (1981). 
7.  See Bulow (1981), Miller and Scholes (1981), and Pesando (1981) on the beneficial 
interest of  employees in the pension fund. 
8.  More specifically, Bodie (1980~.  19806) showed that to minimize the variance of  the 
real return on assets, i.e., to come as close as possible to a risk-free price-indexed invest- 
ment, the assets should be invested in Treasury bills because their nominal yield varies 
directly with inflation. Although the close correlation of  the nominal yield on bills and 
inflation has characterized the past 2 decades, the same relation did not hold in earlier years 
(Mishkin 1981; Summers 1981u, 19816); in Bodie’s defense, however, it may reasonably be 
argued that  the Fcderal  Reserve  policy  in  the decade before  1953 makes this  period 
irrelevant and that  the next  decade was  one of  such  price  stability  that  nothing can 
reasonably be inferred about the relation between inflation and short-term interest rates. 
Bodie shows also that the historical variance may be slightly reduced by including commod- 
ity futures as well. Bodie’s  optimum assumes that short sales by pensions are not permitted. 
9. In principle, the employee decides  the size of the pension contribution and the form of 
investment simultaneously. The present analysis takes the size of  contribution as given. 
10.  If pensions could sell bills short and invest in bonds, the true optimum would be on 
the extension of line 
11. Intuitively. an individual who has assumed no risk will always be willing to accept a 
small amount of  risk in order to raise the mean return. 
12.  Note that a result like (4) can be obtained with constant proportional risk aversion in 
continuous time models; see Bodie (1979). 
13.  It is of  course possible that an increase in inflation uncertainty  could reduce the 
degree of  indexing, that is. that the indifference curve would be tangent to  at a point 
between E’ and u’.  This would imply that risk aversion decreased as risk increased for given 
yield, surely an unlikely preference. 
14.  Because a perfect index asset does not exist, such a perfect index pension would have 
to be a real liability of the corporation and its shareholders. Shareholders would have to be 
compensated for accepting  such risk,  and the return to employees might therefore be 
negative.  The analysis based  on figure 8.1 and equation  (2) can  be  interpreted as an 
approximation to either  the opportunity  that  shareholders offer to employees or  the 
opportunity made available by the market. 
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15. If the constraint that prohibits short positions were relaxed, the minimum variance 
pension might involve a negative amount of the unindexed pension. Bodie’s calculation that 
the minimum variance portfolio contains only bills is actually a constrained minimum with 
the short sale of  bonds prohibited. Bodie’s calculation also assumes ph = 0. 
16. At  U = 0,  du/dp = 0.  To see  this,  note  that  the  variance  of  the  pension  is 
uz  = [(C - fJ2ugo  + U:u + 2U(C -  U)U~~]  and  therefore  du2/dU = 2[  -  (C- U)uZb 
+ UuiU  + (C -  2U)udb]. When (.$,  = u&,,  da21dU  = 0  at  U = 0.  Since  dpldU  =  (pu 
17. The rate of  return on social security contributions during this period was substan- 
tially greater because the tax rate (t)  was increased substantially (from 0.020 in 1950 to0.133 
in 1981). Social security taxes are also levied only on a portion of payroll income and not on 
the entire employee compensation. 
18. Before 1972, the United States social security system was not formally indexed. The 
law was changed occasionally to adjust the benefits of  retirees, but real benefits fluctuated 
around a gencrally constant ratio of benefits to real wages. However, it was only in the late 
1960s that inflation began to appear as a serious and persistent problem for retirees. 
19. The alternative would be to accumulate a social security fund and use its earnings to 
pay benefits. The working generation could guarantee the real value of  benefits to retirees, 
varying the tax rate to obtain the necessary funds. 
20.  I continue to assume that the total amount of  retirement savings is fixed and divided 
between social security and the private pension. 
21.  This substitution of  a  low-yield unfunded social security pension for real capital 
formation in a funded private pension is another of the adverse consequences of  increased 
inflation uncertainty. Someone who was trying to develop a positive theory of  the growth of 
social security benefits might note that optimal behavior required a rise in relative benefits 
as inflation and inflation uncertainty increased and that this is indeed what has happened in 
recent years. A worker with median earnings  who retired at age 65 received benefits equal to 
about one-third of peak earnings until 1972.  A change in the benefit formula  then caused the 
ratio to rise rapidly to more than 50% (in 1980) with an implied steady-state  value of  more 
than 40%. A more historically minded student of  social security might explain the unpre- 
cedented rise by the electoral politics of  1972 and the unintended effects of  inappropriate 
indexing formulas. 
22.  I say “potential” uncertainty because the social security program may guarantee real 
benefits and allow the tax rate on employees to vary. The present United States legislative 
debate about the choice between raising taxes and reducing benefits is testing whether the 
“uncertainty” is “potential” or “actual.” 
23.  The formal condition is that the regression of  the unindexed pension yield on the 
social security yield be less than one. 
-  pb)  >  0, du/dp = 0. 
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